![]() Q: How was the attack viewed by the Japanese military and people immediately, and how did that change over time?Ī: They saw it as a tremendous success and it was until the turning point at the Battle of Midway. fleet to recover much quicker than expected. However, they missed the chance to neutralize oil tanks and shipyards in Pearl Harbor, which turned out to be a fatal error, allowing the U.S. They saw protecting their aircraft carriers as their main concern. Q: Despite the devastation of the attack were there missed opportunities for the Japanese?Ī: Japanese military planners had refueled and readied planes for a possible American counterattack following the first wave. Due to a “strong echo” on the radar screen, the two radar operators assumed a huge fleet of aircraft were approaching and immediately reported it to headquarters.īut the entire signals platoon at Fort Shafter was at breakfast and a young, inexperienced lieutenant on duty misinterpreted the radar operators’ report and assumed it was a B-17 squadron that had taken off from California and was due to arrive in Hawaii at about that time. When Japanese pilots were about halfway to Pearl Harbor, an Army radar station on the north coast of Oahu spotted incoming aircraft. But in 2002 a Hawaiian research team discovered the sunken Japanese midget sub and its dead crew in the harbor. In fact, the reports were written off as unrealistic even a decade after the attacks. This should have been a big warning to higher command, but neither the commander in chief of the Pacific fleet nor his staff gave the report much attention because similar past reports had proven to be false alarms. The USS Ward dropped four depth charges, believing at least one had struck its target. patrol boats and minesweepers returned to the harbor and the net lowered to allow them in stayed open for the next four hours.ĭuring that window, another alarm sounded that a submarine appeared to be entering the harbor in the wake of a U.S. The commander immediately searched the area but, finding nothing, cancelled the alarm. destroyer commander received reports from minesweepers that they’d spotted a submarine periscope a few miles south of the Pearl Harbor entrance. side as the attack commenced?Ī: Just before 4 a.m. Q: What were some mistakes or missed opportunities on the U.S. 7, 1941 Pearl Harbor attack who strongly disagreed with going to war with the United States and was later killed in the conflict. ships were not protected by torpedo nets and that the ships went on maneuvers during the week but returned to harbor on the weekends. That’s how the military knew to attack when they did. Japanese spies in Hawaii proved invaluable. Those new torpedoes were put under rapid manufacturing and delivered to the fleet on Nov. They had to fit the torpedoes with wooden fins, which stabilized them and kept them from sinking below 40 feet. In training for the attack, pilots also found another problem, Model II torpedoes released from the air sank to 65 feet in the water, meaning their explosions would be ineffective in the harbor, which was 40 feet deep at most points. There were early plans to attack at night, but those were changed when pilots found problems forming squadrons in dark. False radio signals were transmitted from the Japanese coast to deceive American intelligence units.Įven though the fleet was in place, the official Japanese government decision to attack Pearl Harbor didn’t come until Dec. That entire mobile fleet was under complete radio silence. “I should regard it as my destiny,” he wrote. But he saw no other choice as his duty to his government and emperor were ironclad. “A decision (to go to war) has been made that is diametrically opposed to my attitude as an individual,” Yamamoto wrote a friend before the operation. “A war with such small prospects for success should not be waged,” Nagano said in transcripts of the Imperial Congress ahead of the attack. Isoroku Yamamoto opposed a war with the United States. Some of the top leadership, including Adm. Japanese leaders realized that the United States had vast resources and reach and could win a prolonged war with Japan. But as recently as the summer of 1941, only five months before the attack, most leadership wanted to avoid a fight with the United States. A: Following an oil embargo and stalled negotiations as to Japan’s territorial claims in China, members of the military and some government leaders saw a preemptive strike on United States positions as what would determine the survival of the Japanese empire.
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